"The strange entanglement of jurimorphs"

I want to stress how reassuring it is for me to see that it is actually the mode of existence I call [LAW] that has been so generously commented by English speaking jurists. Overall, I take this volume as a confirmation of my claim that [LAW] has resisted much better than all the other modes the crushing weight imposed by an exclusively epistemological definition of what true and false really mean. If I employed the legal institution to offer a tentative protection to the diversity of all the modes before the notion of preposition [PRE] was firmly instituted, it is because everyone seems to agree that law has its own way of defining true and false, although everyone also agrees that such a way does not resemble what is needed for extending the scope of referential statements [REF]. Even if this original way of the law is ridiculed for its formalism, belittled for its archaic dramaturgy, mocked for its wide use of imaginary solutions, it remains the case that it is always recognized that what holds legally, well, holds for good — in some fashion to be determined.